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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 03-3355

SHAO YAN LIN,
Petitioner
v.
BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE
BOARD OF IMM IGRATION APPEALS
Agency No. A 72 492 294

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 13, 2004

Before: RENDELL, BARRY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: August 6, 2004 )

OPINION

BARRY, Circuit Judge
Shao Yan Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, petitions for
review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), reversing the

decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and denying her application for asylum. We
have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and will deny the petition for review.
I.
Lin entered the United States on October 21, 1992, and was placed in exclusion
proceedings. On March 12, 1993, she filed an application for asylum with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). She alleged that she suffered harm as a
result of her activities relating to the June 1989 pro-democracy movement. Lin
subsequently filed an amended asylum application, indicating, as an additional ground,
that she feared persecution on account of China’s one-child family planning policy. She
conceded excludability.
Hearings were held before the IJ, and Lin alleged the following facts. In 1989, Lin
was a teacher in an elementary school in China. On June 2, 1989, she took time off from
her teaching position and attended her first and only pro-democracy demonstration in
Fuzhou City. She returned to work the next day. Although two of the organizers of the
demonstration were Lin’s former classmates, Lin had no leadership role but was merely a
participant. Following the demonstration, Lin learned that Chinese authorities were
looking for her former classmates. Lin offered to hide them at her parents’ home, and
they stayed there for approximately one month, until mid-July 1989. The authorities soon
suspected that Lin housed the organizers. In late July, Lin was questioned by school
officials and ordered to attend daily “patriotic” study sessions. In May 1990, ten months
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after she housed the organizers, Lin was dismissed from her teaching position. She was
unable to find another teaching job because the authorities had reported the termination to
what she described as the “superior education department of the area.” (App. at 145).
Although Lin subsequently tried to work as a clerk, cashier, and fruit vendor, she
“couldn’t really make money on these.” (Id.). In March 1991, Lin received a notice to
appear at the local police station. She did not go to the station but, rather, went into
hiding out of fear of being jailed. In August 1991, she went to Russia with the help of a
“snakehead.” The authorities subsequently visited her parents’ home a few times to
inquire about her whereabouts. They also confiscated some of her personal belongings.
Lin arrived in this country in October 1992. In January 1994, she married Chen
Yu, a Chinese citizen residing here, apparently illegally. They have one son, who was
born here in August 1997. Lin states that they plan to have more children.
In a decision dated March 8, 2001, the IJ granted Lin’s petition for asylum.1
Although the IJ determined that Lin did not establish past persecution, he nevertheless
found her to be credible and determined that she established a well-founded fear of
persecution if returned to China. The fear of persecution was based on her participation
in the pro-democracy movement, as well as on China’s family planning policy.
The government appealed to the BIA. In a decision dated July 17, 2003, the BIA
sustained the appeal and reversed the IJ’s decision. The BIA initially agreed with the IJ
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The record indicates that Yu’s petition for asylum is still pending.
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that Lin did not suffer past persecution. It also did not disturb the IJ’s finding of
credibility because it concluded that even if Lin were credible, she failed to establish a
well-founded fear of persecution if returned to China. According to the BIA, it was
“unclear whether the applicant lost her teaching job as a result of her alleged political
activities. In any event, although she was unable to find another teaching position, the
applicant was able to find other employment without any government interference.”
(App. at 3). The BIA indicated that Lin was “never detained, physically abused, or even
threatened with such treatment by government officials as a result of her alleged political
activities.” Id. Moreover, it stated that Lin’s parents, who allegedly housed the
demonstration organizers, continue to reside in China without incident. Lastly, the BIA
determined that Lin did not establish a fear of persecution on account of China’s family
planning policy because: (1) it is unclear whether Lin’s child will return to China with
her; (2) Lin may not have broken the population control law because the child was born
outside of China; and (3) Lin’s position that she will have additional children “is merely
speculative at this point.” Id. at 3-4.
Lin filed a petition for review in this Court. Because the BIA issued its own
decision, we review the decision of the BIA, and not that of the IJ. Awolesi v. Ashcroft,
341 F.3d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 2003); Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001).
We must uphold the BIA’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence in the
record, sustaining that decision “unless the evidence not only supports a contrary
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conclusion, but compels it.” Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 471 (3d Cir. 2003)
(quoting Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001)).
II.
An alien may be granted asylum “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A). Moreover,
a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo
involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to
undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population
control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of
political opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he or she
will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for
such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded
fear of persecution on account of political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B).
To establish eligibility for asylum based on past persecution, petitioner must show:
“(1) an incident, or incidents, that rise to the level of persecution; (2) that is ‘on account
of’ one of the statutorily-protected grounds; and (3) is committed by the government or
forces the government is either ‘unable or unwilling’ to control.” Abdulrahman v.
Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations and internal quotations omitted). If
past persecution has not been established, petitioner may still be granted asylum if she
shows that she has a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to her native country.
Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002). To do so, petitioner must demonstrate
that: (1) she has a subjective fear of persecution in her native country on account of one
5

of the statutorily enumerated grounds; (2) there is a reasonable possibility of suffering
such persecution if she were to return to that country; and (3) she is unable to return to
that country because of such fear. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2).
The BIA found that Lin did not suffer past persecution in China. We will not
disturb this finding because the record surely does not compel a contrary conclusion. We
have previously held that “persecution connotes extreme behavior, including ‘threats to
life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat
to life or freedom.’” Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted). Here, the allegations that Lin was fired from her teaching position, and that the
authorities visited her parents’ home to ask about her whereabouts, simply do not amount
to persecution.
We will also uphold the BIA’s finding that Lin did not establish a well-founded
fear of persecution if returned to China. The record does not demonstrate that Lin was
ever threatened with or subjected to detention or physical mistreatment on account of her
activities relating to the pro-democracy demonstration in 1989. Moreover, as the BIA
indicated, Lin’s parents, in whose home the two organizers were harbored, have resided
in China for the past fourteen years without incident. See In re A-E-M, 21 I.& N. Dec.
1157 (BIA 1998) (noting that the reasonableness of petitioner’s fear of persecution is
undercut when his family remains in the native country unharmed for a long period of
time after petitioner’s departure); see also Medhin v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 685, 691 (7th
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Cir. 2003); Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 573 (1st Cir. 1999); Cuadras v. INS, 910
F.2d 567, 571 (9th Cir. 1990). In addition, according to the State Department Country
Report on China (dated April 14, 1998), “[t]he more remote in time the applicant’s
political involvement, the less likely he or she would be to face reprisals from the
Government.” (App. at 525). Lin’s alleged involvement in the pro-democracy
demonstration took place over fourteen years ago, further undermining any contention
that she will suffer persecution if she returns to China.
Moreover, there is substantial evidence to support the BIA’s conclusion that Lin
failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution based on China’s family planning
policy. The Country Report indicates that in the Fuzhou area (where Lin is from),
“sterilization or use of the IUD appears to be urged only for families who have already
had two children or perhaps three (if the first two are girls), even if the extra child was
approved.” (App. at 535) (emphasis added). The Report also notes that although “there
are no reports of any national policy” concerning the enforcement of the one-child rule
with regard to Chinese parents who have children in the United States, anecdotal
information has revealed that “[a]t least some couples that have children in the United
States beyond the nominal limits and then return to China are, at worst, given modest
fines.” (App. at 541).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.

